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TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN:
DETAINMENT
INCIDENT TO A SEARCH
WARRANT IN BAILEY V. UNITED
STATES
ALEXANDER HALL
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1968, the Fourth Amendment prohibited police officers
1
from detaining an individual without probable cause. However, Terry
2
v. Ohio significantly complicated Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
ruling that some searches (and later seizures) are so substantially less
intrusive than arrests that they are permissible without probable
3
4
cause. Bailey v. United States challenges the scope of permissible
non-arrest seizures by questioning whether it is permissible under the
Fourth Amendment for police officers to detain an occupant of a
residence, incident to a valid search warrant for that residence, who
5
has left the premises prior to the search. The decision presents an
opportunity for the Court to reinforce its long-held position that
searches and seizures permitted without probable cause represent
6
narrowly tailored exceptions to the probable cause requirement. The
Court will likely decide that officers may not detain an occupant who
has left the premises and announce a narrow limiting principle based
on geographic proximity, similar to that expounded in the recent



J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law.
1. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that under particular circumstances, a
police officer may detain an individual and “conduct a carefully limited” search for weapons
without probable cause for arrest).
2. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
3. Id.
4. Bailey v. United States, No. 11-770 (U.S. argued June 4, 2012).
5. Id.
6. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (referring to Terry and its progeny
as “brief and narrowly circumscribed intrusions”).
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II. FACTS
In July of 2005, a Suffolk County Police Department detective
8
obtained a search warrant for a basement apartment. The warrant
specified that the target of the search was a chrome handgun and that
the suspected occupant was a “heavy set black male with short hair”
9
known as “Polo.” Shortly before executing the warrant, detectives
observed two men, both matching the description of “Polo,” exit the
stairway leading to the basement apartment, enter a vehicle, and drive
10
away. After following the vehicle for approximately one mile, and
around five minutes after the men exited the apartment, officers
11
stopped the vehicle.
After the stop, detectives “patted-down” the two men and, upon
request, the men identified themselves as Chunon Bailey (Petitioner)
12
and Bryant Middleton. Despite presenting a driver’s license bearing
a different address, Bailey told officers he was coming from his house,
13
the basement apartment named in the warrant. Middleton
14
corroborated Bailey’s statement. Thereafter, the men were placed in
handcuffs and informed that they were being detained, not arrested,
15
in relation to the execution of the search warrant. Bailey and
16
Middleton were then transported back to the basement apartment.
Upon arrival, officers informed them that a gun and drugs were
discovered during the search and subsequently arrested the two
17
men. The period between Bailey’s stop and formal arrest was less
18
than ten minutes.

7. 556 U.S. 332 (2009); see id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of arrest.”).
8. United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2710
(U.S. June 4, 2012) (No. 11-770).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 201.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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The government indicted Bailey based on the evidence found in
19
his home and his statements to the detaining officers. Bailey moved
to suppress the evidence used to indict on the theory that the
20
detainment violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Bailey’s
21
detention was lawful under Michigan v. Summers because it was
22
incident to the search warrant. In the alternative, the court stated
that the detention was lawful under Terry as an investigative
23
detention. After a nine-day trial, Bailey was found guilty on all
24
charges. Bailey appealed the final judgment of conviction, arguing
25
that his detainment was not lawful under either Summers or Terry.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
26
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” Prior to the seminal
decision of Terry, the probable cause requirement, which was
considered to be absolute, ensured a reasonableness requirement for
27
all seizures of persons. The Supreme Court characterized the
probable cause requirement as the best compromise between
protecting citizens from “rash and unreasonable interferences with
privacy” and allowing law enforcement sufficient latitude to protect
28
the community. However, in 1968, the Supreme Court departed from
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis by carving out an exception
29
to the probable cause requirement and creating a new category of
seizures to be evaluated for reasonableness under a balancing test
30
rather than under the probable cause standard.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 452 U.S. 692 (1981); see id. at 705 (holding “that a warrant to search for contraband
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants
of the premises while a proper search is conducted” (citations omitted)).
22. Bailey, 652 F.3d at 201.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 202. Bailey also appealed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1979) (“Terry for the first time
recognized an exception to the requirement that Fourth Amendment seizures of persons must
be based on probable cause.”).
28. Id. at 208 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
29. Id. at 209–10 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968)).
30. See id. at 210 (“[Terry] defined a special category of Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ so
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A. The Creation of Non-Arrest Detainment Governed by the Fourth
Amendment
The Terry Court held that a police officer may temporarily detain
and search an individual, without a warrant or probable cause, if the
officer reasonably believes that criminal activity is afoot and the
search is necessary to protect his safety or the safety of others in the
31
area. The decision set precedent for the proposition that the Fourth
Amendment permits forms of detainment besides arrests and, as a
corollary, that such detainments may be permissible with less than
32
probable cause.
Prior to Terry, “[t]he standard of probable cause represented . . .
the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion
33
involved in an arrest ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.” In
analyzing the protections of the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he term
‘arrest’ was synonymous with those seizures governed by the Fourth
34
Amendment.”
Terry muddled these “relatively simple and
35
straightforward” basic principles by drawing a distinction between
36
less intrusive seizures and full-blown arrests. This new subcategory of
37
38
seizures is not subject to the probable cause requirement, but
rather must be determined “reasonable” under a relatively
39
amorphous balancing test that analyzes both the government’s
interests in executing the search or seizure and the harm that the
40
search or seizure entails, on a case-by-case basis.

substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make
Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test.”).
31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1986).
32. See George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985
DUKE L.J. 849, 856–57 (“Terry held that one such type of detention . . . was permissible on less
than probable cause.” (citation omitted)).
33. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10–11 (discussing “the public debate over the power of the police
to ‘stop and frisk’ . . . suspicious persons”).
37. See id. at 16 (rejecting the notion that the use of the practice known as “stop and frisk”
does not rise to the level of a “search” or “seizure”).
38. See id. at 20 (“If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether ‘probable cause’ existed to justify the
search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case.”).
39. See id. (“[T]here is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure)
entails.’” (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967))).
40. See id. (“[A] judge . . . must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure in light of the particular circumstances.”).
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Following Terry, the Court applied its exception to the probable
41
cause requirement in other cases, though it was careful to limit the
42
exception’s scope. The Supreme Court made clear that the probable
cause requirement was still the relevant standard and that Terry and
43
its progeny represent narrowly defined exceptions. However, the
Court implied that it would be willing to apply the Terry balancing
44
test to seizures that are “substantially less intrusive than arrests.”
B. Michigan v. Summers: The Evolution of Non-Arrest Detainment
In Summers, the Court again faced the threshold issue of whether
to evaluate the reasonableness of a pre-arrest seizure using the
traditional probable cause requirement or the balancing test seen in
45
Terry. The pre-arrest seizure in Summers occurred just prior to
46
police officers executing a warrant to search a house for narcotics.
Before initiating the search, officers observed Summers descending
the front steps of the residence and subsequently detained him while
47
they searched the premises. After discovering narcotics and
48
determining that Summers owned the home, the police arrested him.
The Court cited the Terry line of cases as recognizing that certain
seizures, despite being covered by the Fourth Amendment, may be
made based on less than probable cause because they constitute such
a limited intrusion to the detainee and are justified by substantial law
49
enforcement interests. The Court’s analysis traced the balancing test
applied in Terry, weighing private and governmental interests in order

41. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (holding that
special enforcement problems facing roving Border Patrol agents could justify vehicle stops if
the agents were aware of specific facts indicating that the vehicle contained illegal aliens);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972) (holding that a police officer could use force to
detain a suspect based on an informant’s tip that the suspect was armed and possessed
narcotics).
42. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (“[T]his Court has been careful to
maintain [Terry’s] narrow scope.”).
43. See id. at 214 (“[O]ur recognition of the[] dangers [of not utilizing the probable cause
requirement] and our consequent reluctance to depart from the proved protections afforded by
the general rule, are reflected in the narrow limitations emphasized in the cases employing the
balancing test.”).
44. See id. at 212 (“The narrow intrusions involved in those cases were judged by a
balancing test . . . only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated
with an arrest.” (citation omitted)).
45. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700–01 (1981).
46. Id. at 693.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 696–99.
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to determine which standard to apply. The Court ultimately
permitted the detainment, noting numerous rationales to support the
application of the balancing test, including:
 A magistrate authorized a “substantial invasion of the
privacy of the persons who resided” in the premises by
issuing a search warrant after finding probable cause to
51
believe that the law was being violated.
52
 The detainment was less intrusive than the search itself.
53
 Most citizens “would elect to remain” in the premises.
 The form of detention used was not likely to be abused or
54
prolonged.
 The additional public stigma from the detainment would
55
be minimal.
 “[P]reventing flight in the event that incriminating
56
evidence is found.”
57
 Reducing the risk of physical harm to the officers.
58
 Facilitating the orderly competition of the search.
 The search warrant “provides an objective justification for
59
the detention.”

50. See id. at 700–01 (“[I]n order to decide whether this case is controlled by the general
[probable cause] rule, it is necessary to examine both the character of the official intrusion and
its justification.”).
51. Id. at 701.
52. Id. The Court, however, admitted that the detainment was itself “a significant restraint
on [the occupant’s] liberty.” Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (“[T]he type of detention imposed here is not likely to be exploited by the officer
or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers
seek normally will be obtained through the search and not through the detention.”).
55. Id. at 702 (“[B]ecause the detention . . . was in respondent’s own residence, it could
add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itself and would involve
neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police
station.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 702–03 (“[T]he execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy
evidence.”).
58. Id. at 703 (explaining that the occupants of the residence may “open locked doors or
locked containers to avoid the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also
delay the completion of the task at hand”).
59. Id. at 703–04 (“The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an
easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a
detention of that occupant.”).
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Following the recital of these considerations, the Court announced
the categorical holding that “for Fourth Amendment purposes . . . a
warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants
60
of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Thus, the Court
61
created another “narrowly defined intrusion” not subject to the
probable cause requirement.
In the wake of the decision, lower courts offered varied
62
interpretations of the scope of Summers. One key issue in dispute is
whether Summers gives authority to “detain an occupant who leaves
the premises during or immediately before the execution of a search
63
warrant and is detained a few blocks away.” Appellate courts that
64
have considered the issue have split, with three allowing detention
65
and two disallowing it. Some of the legal and policy issues dividing
the courts are whether Summers includes an implicit bright-line rule
that limits detainment within a certain geographic proximity to the
premises, whether police safety and efficiency rationales apply once
the subject has left the premises, and whether granting authority to
detain subjects that have left the premises would lead to abuse.
In the 2009 case of Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court shed some
light on how it might rule on the issue dividing the lower courts. Gant
addressed the issue of whether police officers’ search of a suspect’s
car, while the suspect was handcuffed in a police car, is a permissible
66
search. In holding the search impermissible, the Court enumerated a
geographic limiting principle, based largely on the conclusion that the
rationales supporting the search of the car do not apply when the
suspect is not within geographical proximity of the passenger
67
compartment.

60. Id. at 705.
61. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979).
62. See United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
2710 (U.S. June 4, 2012) (No. 11-770) (discussing the varied lower court decisions).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1023 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 341 (6th Cir.
1991).
65. See e.g., United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 95 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 347 (8th Cir. 1994).
66. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).
67. See id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only
if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”).
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IV. HOLDING
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the issue
in Bailey was “decid[ing] whether the same authority pursuant to
which police officers may detain an occupant at the premises during
the execution of a search warrant permits them to detain an occupant
who leaves the premises during or immediately before the execution
68
of a search warrant and is detained a few blocks away.” In addressing
69
an issue of first impression in the circuit, the court considered five
other circuits’ holdings in cases bearing on essentially the same issue
70
and comprised of similar facts. After reviewing the decisions, the
court unanimously concluded that Summers permits officers to detain
an occupant who leaves the premises, provided that the officers
identify the subject “in the process of leaving the premises subject to
71
the search” and detain the subject “as soon as practicable.”
The Second Circuit cited several of the justifications enumerated
by the Seventh, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits in favor of extending
72
Summers. These rationales, essentially the same as those offered in
73
Summers, focus on police performance and safety, as well as on the
74
existence of an identifiable justification for the detention. The cases
that do not extend Summers discuss the same rationales, but
emphasize that these rationales do not apply once a subject has left
75
the premises. The Bailey Court vehemently disagreed with the latter
68. Bailey, 652 F.3d at 204.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 204–06.
71. Id. at 206.
72. Id. at 204–05.
73. United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that once the
defendant became aware of the warrant he “became a flight risk and a potential risk to the
officers’ safety in executing the warrant given his suspected illegal association with the
residence”); United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2002) (observing that the
defendant’s conduct “warranted the belief that [the defendant] would have fled or alerted the
other occupants of the residence about the agents nearby if he were released immediately after
the stop and frisk”); United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Summers does
not impose upon police a duty based on geographic proximity (i.e., defendant must be detained
while still on his premises); rather, the focus is upon police performance, that is, whether the
police detained defendant as soon as practicable after departing from his residence.”).
74. Bailey, 652 F.3d at 204 (“[T]he nexus between the defendant and the residence [gives]
officers an ‘easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal
activity justifie[s] a detention of that occupant.’” (quoting Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711)).
75. Id. at 205 (citing United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994)) (“[O]nce an occupant leaves . . . without
knowledge of the warrant, Summers is inapplicable because he ceases to (1) be a threat to the
officers’ safety, (2) be in a position to destroy evidence, or (3) be able to help facilitate the
search . . . .”).
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set of cases, concluding “that it is the very interests at stake in
Summers that permit detention of an occupant nearby, but outside of,
76
the premises.” The court noted that officers believed that drugs were
being sold from the premises and that the suspected resident was
armed, and therefore “it was reasonable for the officers to assume
that detaining Bailey outside the house might lead to the destruction
of evidence or unnecessarily risk the safety of the officers” by alerting
77
potential occupants of an imminent search. Furthermore, because
Bailey’s ten-minute detention was not unreasonably prolonged and
officers did not “exploit the detention by trying to obtain additional
evidence from Bailey,” the detention did not violate his Fourth
78
Amendment rights.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. The Government’s Arguments
The Government’s argument rests primarily on the claim that
Bailey’s detention is justified by the same rationales underlying the
79
Summers rule. It asserts that officers should be able to detain an
occupant who has just left the premises because an occupant who
80
learns of a search might flee the jurisdiction or return to the
81
premises to disrupt the investigation. Detaining an occupant
immediately is “far safer for officers” than letting an occupant leave
82
and then detaining him upon his potential return. Further, the
Government suggests that the occupant’s presence will help in the
“orderly completion of the search” regardless of where the occupant
83
was originally detained. Ultimately, the Government posits that the
proper inquiry under Summers should be whether the detainment

76. Id.
77. Id. at 206.
78. Id. at 206–07.
79. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 8, Bailey v. United States, No. 11-770
(U.S. May 3, 2012) [hereinafter Brief in Opposition] (“[D]etention of an occupant of a place
about to be searched . . . only marginally intrudes upon the occupant’s privacy interests, while
such detention advances substantial law enforcement interests such as ‘preventing flight,’
‘minimizing the risk of harm to the officers,’ and ‘orderly completion of the search.’” (quoting
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981))).
80. Id. at 11 (“[A]nyone on the premises or nearby could readily alert a departing
occupant to the search by placing a call to his cell phone or sending him a text message.”).
81. Id. at 9.
82. See id. at 11 (finding that the occupant may return to obstruct the search, possibly
armed and with the assistance of others).
83. See id. at 9 (“[T]he occupant can assist in opening any locked doors or containers.”).
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84

occurred “as soon as practicable.” In support of its position, the
Government points out that Summers itself noted that “the fact that
respondent was leaving his house when the officers arrived” was not
85
constitutionally significant.
B. Bailey’s Arguments
Bailey makes four distinct arguments in support of his plea for
relief. First, the officers’ actions do not fall within the narrow
86
exception to the probable cause requirement set out in Summers.
Second, the rationales that support Summers are not applicable once
87
the occupant leaves the premises. Third, the detention of a departed
occupant is more intrusive and poses a greater risk of abuse than the
88
form of detention seen in Summers. Finally, the expansion of
Summers would not be consistent with the Fourth Amendment and
89
existing case law.
1. Bailey’s Detention Falls Outside the Scope of the Summers
Rule
Bailey asserts that Summers announced a categorical rule that
permits the detainment of those who “presently occupy[] the
premises” but does not permit detainment of “persons who have
90
formerly occupied [the premises] and since departed.” Bailey posits
that in the Court’s previous invocations of Summers, its analysis
affirmed the proposition that the Summers exception governs only
91
detentions that occur at the premises to be searched. Further, Bailey
dismisses the fact that, in Summers, the individual was seized on the
front steps of the home, rather than inside, as insignificant to the
92
decision. Proceeding on the aforementioned analysis, Bailey
emphasizes that the detention in the case at hand “differs in kind
84. Id. at 9–10 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 n.16).
85. Id.
86. Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Bailey v. United States, No. 11-770 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2012).
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id. at 31, 33–34.
89. Id. at 37.
90. Id. at 18–19 (citing Amir Hatem Ali, Note, Following the Bright Line of Michigan v.
Summers: A Cause for Concern for Advocates of Bright-Line Fourth Amendment Rules, HARV.
C.R.C.L. L. REV. 483, 500 (2010)).
91. Id. at 19 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 611 (1999); Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 364 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
92. See id. at 20 (“[The Court] appears to have applied the principle of de minimis non
curat lex, concluding that the rationales supporting a detention when it occurs entirely inside the
premises operated with similar force when the initial seizure occurs on the doorstep.”).
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from the detention in Summers” for two reasons: the geographic
proximity of the detainment to the residence and the greater indignity
93
of Bailey’s more public initial detainment. Thus, Bailey concludes
that the detention is not justifiable under Summers and that the
94
circuit court erred in expanding the Summers rule.
2. The Rationales that Support Summers Do Not Support
Extending the Rule to This Factual Scenario
Upon concluding that Bailey’s detention was not permitted under
a facial reading of Summers, Bailey argues that none of the rationales
undergirding Summers support extending the rule to allow “the
detention of a former occupant who leaves the immediate vicinity of
95
the premises to be searched.” Bailey notes that although three of the
rationales cited by the Summers Court—minimizing the risk of harm
to officers, facilitating the orderly completion of the search, and
preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found—
may seem to be applicable to the case at hand, the need to bolster
these objectives is not so acute, in the present context, as to override
96
Fourth Amendment protections. Bailey addresses each rationale in
turn.
Bailey begins by offering several reasons why an occupant who
has left the premises poses a minimal safety risk. First, an individual
97
that is not physically present poses no immediate threat of violence.
Second, because police will not want to disclose their presence prior
to executing a search warrant, an occupant will typically have no
reason to believe a search is imminent and therefore have no reason
to communicate with other potential occupants that may
98
subsequently threaten officers’ safety.
Bailey dismisses the Government’s argument that an occupant
that leaves the scene may be alerted to the search by cell phone and
then could “suddenly return—possibly armed and with the assistance
99
of others—to obstruct the search.” Bailey argues that the use of
SWAT teams and other precautions when serving high-risk warrants
93. Id. at 20–21. Bailey also notes that the officers potentially manipulated the timing of
the search to justify the detention. Id.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 16–17.
97. Id. at 22.
98. Id. at 22–23.
99. Id. at 23 (citing Brief in Opposition, supra note 79, at 11–12).
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makes it unlikely that the occupant will return to disrupt the search.
Furthermore, Bailey suggests that accepting the Government’s
argument would justify the detention of anyone associated with the
premises, regardless of their location, because they may be alerted
and return to disrupt the search as easily as an occupant that has just
101
left the residence. Bailey also argues that allowing officers to
conduct detentions away from the residence presents risks
comparable to those involved in the execution of a search warrant,
102
thus offering no additional safety incentive.
Finally, Bailey addresses the arresting officers’ and circuit court’s
concern that “conducting the detention right outside would have
alerted others who may still have been inside . . . potentially
103
compromising the safety of the searching officers.” The weakness in
this argument, Bailey asserts, is that it fails to consider that a
104
detention need not take place. Rather, the individual may be
105
allowed to leave the premises, thus preserving the officers’ safety.
Bailey goes on to argue that detaining an individual away from
the premises does not help facilitate the orderly completion of the
search. He notes that as a matter of common sense, an individual who
106
is not present cannot interfere with the execution of a search. Bailey
also argues that detaining an occupant away from the scene and
returning him to the residence detracts from the search because it
diverts human resources, crowds the site of the search, and potentially
107
creates a distraction.
Bailey dismisses as insignificant the
Government’s argument that a returning individual may facilitate the
search by opening locked doors or containers: such assistance is not
108
always needed and cannot be compelled.
Moreover, Bailey states that preventing flight is not a valid
rationale for permitting detainment because an individual who is not
present will ordinarily be unaware of an imminent search and thus

100. Id. at 24 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 270 (1984)).
101. Id. at 25.
102. Id. at 26.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 27.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 28.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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109

have no reason to flee. Bailey goes on to address the Government’s
argument that detainment is justified because a third party could alert
the occupant who has left the residence, prompting an occupant to
110
flee. He claims that this argument could be used to justify the
detention of anyone associated with the premises, regardless of his
location, because the incentive to flee would be identical regardless of
111
his proximity to the premises. Bailey also points out that officers
have alternative means of preventing flight or locating a suspect in
the event of flight that mitigate the Government’s prevention of flight
112
concerns.
3. The Detention of an Occupant Who Has Left the Premises Is
More Intrusive and More Prone to Abuse
Bailey states that a detainment away from the immediate vicinity
of the residence “produce[s] all the indignity of an arrest in full view
113
of the public.” This additional indignity is caused by a prolonged
public detainment that involves being placed in handcuffs and being
114
transported in a police car. Moreover, Bailey states that because a
detention away from the residence must be conducted by a team of
officers, separate from the team preoccupied with conducting the
search, there is greater opportunity for the detaining officers to
conduct questioning that would not ordinarily be permissible without
115
individualized suspicion. This allegedly creates a perverse incentive
for officers to detain individuals outside the premises in order to
116
facilitate otherwise impermissible questioning.

109. Id. at 29.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 30.
112. See id. (“Officers can follow an individual who has left the scene and then detain him
in the event that incriminating evidence is [found] . . . . [T]hey can readily gather identifying
information that will help track down the individual.”).
113. Id. at 32 (citing Commonwealth v. Charros, 824 N.E.2d 809, 816 (Mass. 2005), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 870 (2005)).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 33–34 (noting that in a detainment in or around the immediate vicinity of the
residence, the officers “will likely be too preoccupied with effectuating the search to take unfair
advantage of the individual”).
116. Id. at 34.
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4. Extending Summers Would Be Inconsistent with the Text of the
Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s Relevant
Jurisprudence
Bailey asserts that extending Summers is incongruent with other
117
Fourth Amendment categorical rules. Rules governing searches
incident to arrests, which Bailey equates to seizures incident to
118
searches, typically come with spatial and temporal limitations.
Bailey suggests that the proper reading of Summers contains just such
a spatial limitation and that to disregard any of the typical limiting
principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would be inconsistent
119
with the Court’s rulemaking in other cases.
Finally, Bailey argues that any extension of Summers is
inconsistent with an originalist interpretation of the Fourth
120
Amendment. After briefly examining the motivations behind the
121
Fourth Amendment, Bailey concludes that extending Summers
would “create a freestanding right to seize persons” that falls outside
the original intent of the Framers to limit seizures to cases with
122
probable cause.
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION
In announcing the Summers categorical rule that “a warrant to
search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries
with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises
123
while a proper search is conducted,” the Supreme Court failed to
specify explicitly whether the rule carried with it any geographical
124
restrictions. As a result, what should have been a bright-line rule
contained sufficient elasticity to be extended in a manner inconsistent
with its underlying rationales, and consequently, with its Fourth

117. Id. at 36.
118. Id. (citing Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth, 85 MICH. L. REV. 427,
455, 457 (1986)).
119. Id. at 36–37 (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969)).
120. Id. at 37.
121. See id. (noting that the Fourth Amendment was adopted largely because of the
Framers’ dislike of the use of general warrants (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761; Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 100–01 (1959))).
122. Id. at 37–39.
123. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
124. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984) (describing Summers as a bright-line rule).
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Amendment restraints.
The Court in Bailey will likely put articulable limits on officer
discretion in applying Summers, much like it did in Arizona v. Gant, in
126
order to avoid regular constitutional violations. In reaching a
conclusion, the Court will likely consider two primary questions: did
the officers’ conduct result in an intrusion equivalent to an arrest, and
if not, was the conduct reasonable in light of the conflicting interests
at stake?
First, the Court will likely hold that the officers’ conduct did not
result in an intrusion equivalent to an arrest. The factual
circumstances of Bailey’s detainment differ from the detention in
Summers; Bailey was handcuffed and driven a short distance back to
his residence in a police car while Summers was detained just outside
of his home. While being handcuffed and escorted in a police car are
certainly indicia of a typical arrest, the Summers Court accorded low
127
weight to the public nature of that detainment, suggesting that it is
unlikely that the Court will view the public stigma associated with a
short ride in a police car as raising the level of intrusion to the point
128
at which probable cause is required.
Second, the Court will likely engage in a “reasonableness”
balancing test to determine whether an extension of the Summers rule
129
would be constitutionally permissible. After weighing the relevant
factors, the Court will likely decline to extend the Summers rule and
instead implement a geographic-proximity limiting principle similar

125. Amir Hatem Ali, Note, Following the Bright Line of Michigan v. Summers: A Cause for
Concern for Advocates of Bright-Line Fourth Amendment Rules, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
483, 512 (2010) (“When courts do not strictly adhere to the policies underlying the bright-line
rule that they apply, they risk extending that rule beyond its rationale, and, in the Fourth
Amendment context, beyond constitutionality.”).
126. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344–48 (2009) (holding that a supposed bright-line rule
permitting searches of vehicles upon custodial arrests was being interpreted and applied in a
way that resulted in regular constitutional violations).
127. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 n.16 (“We do not view the fact that [the defendant] was
leaving his house when the officers arrived to be of constitutional significance. The seizure of
[the defendant] on the sidewalk outside was no more intrusive than the detention of those
residents of the house whom the police found inside.”).
128. But see United States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting, while
discussing Summers, that “[b]ecause Sherrill had already exited the premises, the intrusiveness
of the officers’ stop and detention on the street was much greater”).
129. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[T]here is no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the
search (or seizure) entails.” (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

HALL FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE)

86

1/14/2013 5:56 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 8
130

to the “within reaching distance” standard announced in Gant. The
Summers Court noted that a detainment incident to a search warrant
131
is a “significant restraint on . . . liberty.” Consequently, the Court is
unlikely to impose such a restraint without the full force of law
enforcement interests counterbalancing the restraint on liberty.
Thus, the factor that lends greatest support to the aforementioned
outcome is that the “law enforcement interests” presented in support
of the holding in Summers dissipate when the occupant is no longer
132
on the premises. The Court agreed with an almost identical
argument in Gant, refusing to find that a suspect poses a danger to
officers when the suspect is not within reaching distance of his
133
vehicle. The logic of the Gant Court can be summarized as the
common-sense notion that an individual, who, due to his physical
location, is incapable of harming officers, poses little risk. In
translating that logic to the case at hand, the Court will surely note
that there is a difference in the risk posed by a suspect in police
custody who is out of reach of any dangerous items, as in Gant, and an
occupant of the premises to be searched who has left the area.
Nevertheless, the Court is also likely to observe that the distinction in
the respective risk to officers only materializes in the event that the
occupant returns to the premises during the course of the searchan
unlikely assumption. Moreover, the risk posed by an occupant who is
not present during a search is decidedly lower than even the risk
posed by a detained suspect. Thus, because the Supreme Court was
persuaded that the lack of physical proximity limits the risk of officer
134
harm in an analogous case, the Court is unlikely to sacrifice Fourth
Amendment protections as a result of the relatively minor differences
between two similarly situated groups: suspects who pose minimal
danger because of their distance from potentially dangerous objects,
and occupants who pose minimal danger because of their distance

130. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
131. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701 (“The detention of one of the residents while the premises
were searched [was] admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty . . . .”).
132. See Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346 (“[W]hen the officers stopped Sherrill, the officers had no
interest in preventing flight or minimizing the search’s risk because Sherrill had left the area of
the search and was unaware of the warrant. Thus, we decline the Government’s invitation to
extend Summers to the circumstances of this case.” (citation omitted)).
133. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
134. Id. at 347 (declining to extend New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), because the
Court was “unpersuaded by the State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would
meaningfully further law enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individuals’
privacy”).
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from the premises.
In implementing a limit on officer discretion, the Court will likely
utilize a geographic-proximity restriction, similar to that seen in Gant,
that stems from the same principles elucidated by Eighth and Tenth
135
Circuit decisions. While the circuit court in Bailey stated that
imposing bright-line geographic restrictions on the Summers rule
136
would present officers with a Hobson’s choice, the Supreme Court is
137
likely to disagree with that assessment. It would be hyperbolic to
characterize officers’ options as a binary choice between detaining the
138
occupant as he leaves the premises or losing the occupant forever.
More likely, the Court will apply a spatial restriction in order to
protect personal liberty interests while imposing only an
139
inconvenience to law enforcement officials.

135. See Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346 (declining to apply Summers because “the officers had no
interest in preventing flight or minimizing the search’s risk because Sherrill had left the area of
the search”); see also United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93–94 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that because the defendant was not present at the location of the search, the rationales
underlying Summers did not justify the detention).
136. United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
2710 (U.S. June 4, 2012) (No. 11-770) (noting that extending Summers would leave officers with
the choice of either immediately detaining an occupant observed leaving the premises or
permitting the occupant to leave).
137. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
weakness of this argument is that it assumes that, one way or another, the search must take
place. But conducting a Chimel search is not the Government’s right; it is an exception—
justified by necessity—to a rule that would otherwise render the search unlawful.”).
138. See United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94 (noting that the police’s interest in
preventing flight was reduced because “Edwards did not know that any warrant was being
executed. He thus had no reason to flee. The police knew the address of Edwards’s . . .
residence, and had no reason to believe that he would not return to it . . . .”).
139. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 (“Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches
incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is
anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis.”).

